The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages by Bård Harstad
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I have benefitted from the audiences at the NBER Law & Economics 2011 Summer Meeting, Northwestern
University, the Norwegian School of Economics, the University of Oslo, The Princeton Political Economy
Conference, Yale University, and in particular the comments of Manuel Amador, Wioletta Dziuda,
Jeff Ely, Johannes Hörner, Benny Moldovanu, and Chris Snyder. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Bård Harstad. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages
Bård Harstad




A conservation good, such as the rainforest, is a hostage: it is possessed by S who may prefer to consume
it, but B receives a larger value from continued conservation. A range of prices would make trade
mutually beneficial. So, why doesn't B purchase conservation, or the forest, from S?
If this were an equilibrium, S would never consume, anticipating a higher price at the next stage. Anticipating
this, B prefers to deviate and not pay. The Markov-perfect equilibria are in mixed strategies, implying
that the good is consumed (or the forest is cut) at a positive rate. If conservation is more valuable,
it is less likely to occur. If there are several interested buyers, cutting increases. If S sets the price and
players are patient, the forest disappears with probability one.
A rental market has similar properties. By comparison, a rental market dominates a sale market if the
value of conservation is low, the consumption value high, and if remote protection is costly. Thus,
the theory can explain why optimal conservation does not always occur and why conservation abroad
is rented, while domestic conservation is bought.
Bård Harstad






Everyone is talking about it, but few do anything to stop deforestation. On the one hand,
the South beneﬁts from selling the timber and clearing the land for agriculture or oil
extraction. On the other, the North prefers conservation because the tropical forests are
among the most biodiverse areas in the world, they are inhabited by indigenous people,
and deforestation contributes to 15-20% of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions, causing
global warming.1 If the North’s conservation value is larger than the South’s value of
logging, Coasian bargaining should ensure that the forest is preserved: the North will
simply buy the forests from the South, or pay the current owners for conservation. The
North has plenty of opportunities to do this, either individually or collectively through the
World Bank or the United Nation. The REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation) initiative intends to do exactly this, but REDD is a recent
phenomenon, oﬀered to a limited extent, and so the puzzle remains: why isn’t the North
buying conservation from the South?2
Earlier studies have pointed to corruption, electoral cycles, unclear property rights,
multiple users and owners, multiple buyers, leakage, and the diﬃculties to monitor and
enforce contracts.3 But even when we abstract from these obstacles, the current paper
shows that ineﬃciencies continue to exist in the market for conservation, and they are
fundamentally tied to the nature of the good. For traditional goods, the owner may sell
the good to a potential buyer who intends to consume it. Trade is then predicted to
1IPCC (2007). Negative externalities from forest loss and degradation cost between $2 trillion and $4.5
trillion a year according to The Economist (Sept. 23rd, 2010, citing a UN-backed eﬀort, The Economics
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, TEEB).
2There are several ways of deﬁning the REDD funds; see Karsenty (2008) on details or Parker et al.
(2009) for a summary of the various proposals and the distinction between RED, REDD, and REDD+.
The 2010 Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010) recognize the importance of reducing deforestation and
forest degredation, but are quite imprecise regarding who should pay and how this should be implemented.
3See, for example, Alston and Andersson (2011), Burgess et al. (2011), Angelsen (2010), and the
references therein. For an earlier overview of the sources of deforestation, see Angelsen and Kaimowitz
(1999).
2take place immediately if the buyer’s consumption value is larger than the seller’s. For
conservation goods, however, the buyer is happy with the status quo. He does not desire
to consume the good, but only to prevent the seller from consuming it in the future. The
seller is willing to preserve the good today if the buyer is likely to pay tomorrow, but the
buyer is in no hurry to cash out as long as the seller waits. This contradiction implies
that conservation must end at a positive rate, I ﬁnd.
Conservation goods are diﬀerent from traditional goods, but they are not conﬁned to
rainforests. There are many examples of ”payments for environmental/ecosystem services
(PES; Engel et al., 2008). Bohm (1993) and Harstad (2011) have argued that a climate
coalition would beneﬁt from purchasing and conserving foreign fossil fuel deposits. The
puzzle is why this is not observed in reality. The conservation good can also be real
captives or hostages,4 a peace of art, or historical ruins: as long as the good is conserved,
the buyer may be in no hurry to pay. A legendary example is the nine books of Sibylline
prophecy that were oﬀered to the last King of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus. Books with
prophecies were consulted in stress of war, or in time of plague or famine, and the King was
perhaps in no hurry to pay as long as these books would be available later. Consequently,
the seller had to gradually burn six books before the King accepted to buy the remaining
three.5
To formalize the market for conservation, I present a model with a seller (S), a buyer
(B), and a good (e.g., the forest). S prefers to consume (or ”cut”) the good but B’s
value of conserving it is larger. In each period, B decides whether to contact S. If done, S
suggests a price and B decides whether to accept. If there is no trade, S has the possibility
4The present model, predicting whether an exogenously given hostage will be killed or released, con-
tributes to the literature on hostage-taking (surveyed by Sandler and Arce, 2007). However, I ignore
how the incentive to take hostages is aﬀected by commitment (Selten, 1988), reputation or uncertainty
(Lapan and Sandler, 1988).
5According to the legend, the seller was a strange woman who appeared before the King. She asked
for a steep price and the King declined. The woman asked again for the exact same price for six books
after burning three of them. The King continued to laugh at her, but accepted the original price for the
three remaining books after the woman decided to burn yet three books (Ihne, 1871:74-75).
3to cut. The game stops if the good is sold or consumed. Eﬃciency requires that the good
is never consumed.
Unfortunately, there is only one Markov-perfect equilibrium6 in pure strategies: B
never buys; S always cuts. In particular, it cannot be an equilibrium that B purchases
the good with probability one at a decent price. If B followed such a strategy, S would
conserve the good until B’s next chance of buying the good. Anticipating this, B has an
incentive to deviate.
There is also a set of equilibria in mixed strategies. In each of these, B is more likely
to buy if the value of cutting is large, while S is more likely to cut if the conservation
value is low. Each of the mixed equilibria is associated with a unique equilibrium price.
The set of equilibrium prices is a closed interval. For a high equilibrium price, B is less
likely to buy, while S is more likely to cut. The aggregate welfare is therefore maximized
at the lowest possible price. However, if S can announce the equilibrium price (in addition
to the price in the current period) at the meeting with B, S selects the highest possible
price.
These equilibria survive if the forest can be cut gradually. In fact, the equilibrium
probability of cutting can be interpreted as the random or deterministic expected fraction
that is being cut every period. Thus, random actions are not necessary for the argument.
It is easy to analyze questions regarding incentives in this model. For example, if S
had the possibility to invest and increase the conservation value, she would never make
such an investment. Even if the price would increase following such an investment, S
would not beneﬁt since B would be less likely to buy. If the seller were able to invest
and raise the market value of cutting, the incentives to do so would be stronger than if
conservation were not an issue. The reason is that, if the value of cutting increases, B
6Dynamic games with multiple subgame-perfect equilibria often restrict attention to Markov-perfect
equilibria since they are robust and simple (strategies are then conditioned on only the coarsest payoﬀ-
relevant partition of histories); see Maskin and Tirole (2001) for more on deﬁnition and justiﬁcation.
4buys with a higher probability.
Is a rental market better? After all, the renter is then committing to only one period,
and this reduces the cost of contacting the seller. A rental market is also more similar
to the existing REDD contracts, and the reader may be interested in analyzing them for
that reason. Unfortunately, I ﬁnd that the rental market is not necessarily more eﬃcient
that the sales market. In fact, the rental market has exactly the same problems and
comparative statics as the sales market: The only pure strategy equilibrium is that B
never rents, while S always cuts. There is a range of equilibria in mixed strategies and, in
each of these, B is more likely to pay for conservation if the consumption value is large.
For every equilibrium in the sales market, there exists an equilibrium in the rental market
giving identical payoﬀs.
By comparison, however, the rental market and the sales market are not identical. On
the one hand, the rental market may be strictly worse since the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies in every period as long as the good is not consumed. Thus, the forest is cut
in ﬁnite time almost for sure in the rental market. On the other hand, if there is a cost
of protecting the good (to prevent illegal logging or re-nationalization, for example) and
this cost is higher for B than for S (who is ”local”), then the rental market (i) minimizes
protection costs, (ii) exists for a larger parameter-set than does the sales market, and
(iii) permits the ﬁrst-best is an equilibrium outcome (while the sales market does not).
The model predicts the rental market, rather than the sales market, to be both better
and the equilibrium choice if and only if the conservation value is small relative to the
consumption value, while B’s protection cost is high relative to S’ protection cost. In
other words, domestic conservation will be bought, while conservation across countries
will be rented.
All results survive if time is continuous and there are multiple buyers or sellers.7 If the
7If there are multiple sellers with diﬀerent goods, the buyer(s) may play the described game with each
5number of buyers grows, the aggregate value of conservation increases, and it becomes
more important to buy the forest and prevent cutting. Unfortunately, the equilibrium
implies the opposite: the cutting rate increases with the number of buyers. Furthermore,
the most likely buyer (or renter) has a high protection cost and a relatively low value of
conservation.8 These results are perverse and lead to additional ineﬃciencies. To mitigate
these ineﬃciencies, all potential buyers may be better oﬀ if they collectively agreed to
permit some type of ”privatization” (e.g., allowing for eco-tourism) that increases the
owner’s value even if that would reduce the total conservation value and ex post eﬃciency.
The paper contributes to the debate surrounding the Coase theorem. Coase (1960)
argued that if property rights are well deﬁned and there is no transaction costs, then the
outcome is eﬃcient and invariant to the initial allocation of rights. Coasian bargaining
may break down if there are small transaction costs (Anderlini and Felli, 2006) or private
information (Farrell, 1987). Dixit and Olson (2000) and Ellingsen and Paltseva (2011)
have argued that when the agents are free to opt out of the negotiations, some of them may
prefer to ”stay home” if the others are, in any case, providing some (although ineﬃciently
little) public goods. These assumptions are not necessary for the reasoning in this paper:
instead, it is the possibility to abstain combined with the nature of the good that leads
to ineﬃciency, since the buyer prefers to buy later rather than sooner - as long as the
seller does not consume the good in the meanwhile. While this reasoning requires a
dynamic framework, the model is diﬀerent from both durable goods markets9 and classic
of them independently, and the results below are unchanged. In reality, there can also be multiple users
of the same forest, but PES-contracts may force them to act as one seller (Phelps et al., 2010).
8Consistent with this prediction, Norway is one of the few active providers of REDD funds and has
already initiated results-based payments through partnerships with Brazil, Guyana, and Indonesia.
9As conjectured by Coase (1972) and shown by Bulow (1982), the seller of a durable good has an
incentive to later reduce the price for the remaining customers, implying that the buyers are not willing
to pay a high price today, either. If time is inﬁnite and each period short, the price collapses to the
seller’s own valuation. This may in fact also happen in my model, if the buyer has any bargaining power
(as explained in Section 5). The intuition is, however, quite diﬀerent: For durable goods models, it is
essential that there is more than one buyer valuation, and the price is then gradually dropping over time
so as to sell to more and more of the remaining buyers. In this paper, there is only one buyer type and the
price does not drop over time. More fundamentally, in contrast to the durable goods, the conservation
6war-of-attrition models.10
As an alternative to cutting the forest, a similar game would arise if the owner could
sell the forest to a logger. Such a sale would then create a negative externality on the buyer
interested in conservation. Sale in the presence of externalities were ﬁrst discussed by Katz
and Shapiro (1986) and later analyzed by Jehiel et al. (1996) who let the seller commit to
a sales mechanism. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a) allow for negotiations after the seller is
randomly matched with one of several potential buyers. If the time horizon is ﬁnite, delay
can occur if several periods remain before the deadline, whether the externality is positive
or negative. With negative externalities, this delay is generated by a war of attrition game
between potential ”good” buyers who each hope the other good buyer will purchase the
good before the bad buyer does (causing negative externalities on the good ones). This
story requires at least three buyers. Furthermore, trade will take place with certainty
closer to the deadline. If the buyers have bounded recall, Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995b)
detect delay even with inﬁnite time. However, all these strategies are in pure strategies
- and they are not stationary. In fact, Bj¨ ornerstedt and Westermark (2009) show that
there cannot be delay for sales under negative externalities when restricting attention to
stationary strategies. In other words, trade occurs as soon as the seller is matched with
the ”right” buyer.
This result is nonrobust, as the current paper shows. Formally, the main diﬀerence
is that I endogenize matching between the buyer and the seller. Rather than imposing
an exogenous matching, as in the literature just mentioned, I follow Diamond (1971) by
letting the buyer choose whether to contact the seller. The nonrobustness is obviously a
good in this paper is something the buyer would prefer to buy later rather than sooner, as long as it
continues to exist and the price remains the same. This is driving the ineﬃciency studied below.
10War-of-attrition games were ﬁrst studied by Maynard Smith (1974) in biological settings, but are
often applied in economics. According to Tirole (1998:311) ”the object of the ﬁght is to induce the rival
to give up. The winning animal keeps the prey; the winning ﬁrm obtains monopoly power. The loser
is left wishing it had never entered the ﬁght.” Muthoo (1999:241) provides a similar deﬁnition. In this
paper, in contrast, the buyer is perfectly happy with the staus quo, and he does not hope that the seller
will act. Once the buyer acts, he is also very happy that he did not give in earlier.
7two-edged sword, implying that the delay, emphasized in this paper, would not survive if
a buyer was always forced to meet with the seller. It is also crucial for my results that
the seller has all the bargaining power: if the buyer received a share of the bargaining
surplus, the unique equilibrium requires the lowest possible price and, then, the buyer
buys with probability one. This nonrobustness argument, to continue the debate, is
itself nonrobust: no matter the allocation of bargaining power, the equilibrium is still
ineﬃcient and requires cutting if there are multiple buyers, the meeting cost is positive,
or negotiation failure implies increased cutting.
The next section presents and analyzes a simple model of the sales market. Section
3 analyzes the rental market, compares it to the sales market, and makes predictions
for when we ought to see one rather than the other. Section 4 reviews the results in a
continuous time model and studies the eﬀects of multiple and heterogeneous buyers as
well as policies such as privatization, coordination, and collective action. A number of
extensions and robustness issues are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
The proofs are either in the text or in the Appendix.
2. The Market for Sale
2.1. The Model
The stage game. There are two players: the seller (S or ”she”) and the buyer (B or
”he”). At the beginning of the game, S owns a good (e.g., a forest) which B can purchase.
If B does not buy the good, S decides whether to consume (i.e., ”cut”).
If B does not buy and S does not consume, the status quo stays in place and payoﬀs
are normalized to zero. If S consumes the good, B looses his conservation value and
receives the payoﬀ −V . S, on the other hand, beneﬁts from consumption. For some
applications and results it is fruitful to distinguish between two consumption values:
8First, consumption gives the direct beneﬁt M, which may be interpreted as the market
value of timber or the accessible land (or the sum of these). In addition, by consuming, S
can stop to guard or protect the forest (for illegal logging, for example), and these savings
are measured by GS. In sum, consumption gives S the payoﬀ M + GS.
If S sells at price P, S’ payoﬀ is P + GS since, also in this case, S has no incentive
to guard the good and the guarding cost is saved. B’s payoﬀ, in this case, is −P − GB,
where GB is the buyer’s cost of guarding or protecting the good.
The results below do hinge on a positive GB or GS and, to simplify, the readers may
want to limit attention to the special case GB = GS = 0. I add these parameters only
to get additional insight in the later sections. Furthermore, it may be realistic to assume
that protection is more costly for a foreign buyer, implying GB ≥ GS (see, e.g., Alston et
al., 2011, or the references therein).
Fig. 1: The seller’s and buyer’s payoﬀs depend on whether the buyer buys or seller cuts
The exact timing of the stage game is the following. First, the buyer decides whether to
contact the seller. In contrast to the traditional literature (reviewed in the Introduction),
I do not assume that the buyer and the seller necessarily and exogenously match. Instead,
I endogenize this matching by letting the buyer make the choice of whether to visit the
seller (as in Diamond, 1971, for example). If B does contact S, S proposes a price and B
decides whether to accept. If indiﬀerent, it is conventionally assumed that B accepts S’
proposal. If there is no trade, S decides whether to consume.
With only one period, the equilibrium is straightforward:
9Proposition 0. Suppose there is only one period:
(i) For any exogenous P ∈ (M;V − GB), B buys with probability one.
(ii) When S proposes the price, P = V − GB, and there is an equilibrium where B buys
with probability one.
(iii) These equilibria lead to conservation and, if GB ≤ GS, the ﬁrst-best.
Part (i) shows that the good is conserved with probability one for any exogenous
P ∈ (M;V − GB). This part is for illustration only, since the rest of this paper assumes
that S proposes the price once B contacts S. Then, S proposes P = V − GB and trade
with probability 1 is still an equilibrium. To complement part (ii), note that also other
equilibria exist since B is indiﬀerent when contacting S (B may randomize). To com-
plement part (iii), note that the ﬁrst-best is never an equilibrium outcome if GS < GB,
since the ﬁrst-best would then require that B does not buy and that S does not cut. For
GS = GB, the good in the stage game is simply just like any other normal good, and trade
takes place if and only if the buyer values the good more than the seller. This changes
dramatically in the dynamic version of the game.
The dynamic game. With an inﬁnite time horizon, the game terminates only after
sale or consumption. If there is neither trade nor consumption in a given period, we
enter the next, identical, period. Let  ∈ (0;1) measure the common discount factor. If
gS and gB measure the per-period or ﬂow protection costs, then GS ≡ gS=(1 − ) and
GB ≡ gB=(1 − ). Similarly, V ≡ v=(1 − ), where v is the buyer’s value of conservation
each period.
Again, the ﬁrst-best outcome can easily be described. If GB ≤ GS, immediate sale
implements the ﬁrst-best. If GB > GS, the ﬁrst-best requires the players to never end the
game. If GB = GS, the ﬁrst-best is implemented by both these outcomes.
As in most dynamic games, there are multiple subgame-perfect equilibria. For simplic-
ity, I will restrict attention to Markov-perfect equilibria where the players only condition
their strategies on payoﬀ-relevant histories. In this game, the only payoﬀ relevant parti-
10tion of histories is whether or not the game has terminated (following Maskin and Tirole,
2001). Thus, the Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies are necessarily stationary.
2.2. Equilibrium Strategies
Restricting attention to Markov-perfect equilibria, B’s strategy is simply his probability
of contacting S, b ∈ [0;1], and the probability of accepting an oﬀer from S as a function
of the proposed price. S’ strategy speciﬁes a price oﬀered to B, in case B contacts S, and
the probability of cutting, c ∈ [0;1], if the good is not sold. One can easily show that
B’s will employ a cutoﬀ-strategy by accepting any price lower than some threshold, P,
and S will ask for this exact price. Thus, we can summarize the equilibrium strategies as
(b;c;P).
If M > V − GB, no trading price exists that can make trade mutually beneﬁcial.
Furthermore, if M + GS >  (V − GB + GS), there exists no mutually beneﬁcial price
that would discourage S from cutting, given the chance. From now on, I thus assume
M + GS <  (V − GB + GS), implying V − GB > M= + GS (1 − )=.11
Proposition 1. Suppose V − GB > M= + GS (1 − )=.
(i) There is exactly one equilibrium in pure strategies:
b = 0;c = 1;P = V − GB:



















11However, if M ∈ ( (V − GB) − GS (1 − );V − GB), then there exists a price P ∈ [M;V − GB]
which is such that, although it does not discourage cutting, it makes trade mutually beneﬁcial at the
trading stage. Then, if B contacts S, S suggests the price V − GB and B accepts. Anticipating this, B
is indiﬀerent when considering to contact S, and every b ∈ [0;1] is a best response and an element in an
equilibrium (b;c;P).
11S consumes with probability
c =
(1 − )(P + GB)
V −  (P + GB)
;
B rejects any price higher than P, and S suggests exactly the price P if B contacts S.
Fig. 2: The special case GS = GB = 0
Part (i) describes the unique equilibrium in pure strategies. It is easy to check that this
is indeed characterizing an equilibrium: When considering S’ oﬀer, B is willing to accept
P = V −GB since S cuts for sure otherwise. At this P, however, it is a best response for
B to never contact S. Since there is no chance for trade, S cuts. Unfortunately, there is no
other equilibrium in pure strategies: If S cuts for sure (c = 1), she always requires exactly
this price. If, then, B contacts S for sure (b = 1), then S would not cut - a contradiction.
Similarly, c = 0 cannot be an equilibrium since B would then prefer to never buy, and S
must prefer to cut.
Part (ii) shows that there are multiple equilibria in mixed strategies. Each equilibrium
is characterized by some equilibrium price and B is indiﬀerent when considering whether
to show up while S is indiﬀerent when considering to cut. Thus, if B contacts S and he
anticipates the equilibrium price P, he is indiﬀerent between paying P and continuing the
game as if B had never contacted S. S cannot obtain a price higher than the equilibrium
12P, and she proposes exactly this price. This explains why multiple prices are consistent
with an equilibrium even if S can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer when proposing this
period’s price (in Section 2.4, S announces the equilibrium price as well as this period’s
price; leading to a unique equilibrium).
Each player randomizes such that the opponent is just indiﬀerent and, hence, also
willing to randomize. This explains the comparative static. Suppose P increases (i.e.,
compare an equilibrium with a large price to an equilibrium with a small price). Then,
B is less tempted to buy and, to be willing to randomize, S must be more likely to cut.
At the same time, S becomes inclined to wait for the high price and, thus, B will buy
with a smaller probability (as in Fig. 2). For a ﬁxed P, the seller ﬁnds cutting more
attractive if the market value, M, increases; if the protection cost, GS, increases; or if the
future is more discounted, in that  decreases. To ensure that S is still willing to cut in
these situations, the probability for sale, b, must increase. Hence, B is more likely to buy
conservation if the market value is large, the price for conservation small, and if S ﬁnds
protection costly. Similarly, for a given price, the buyer ﬁnds it less attractive to contact
S if the value of conservation is low and protection is costly. To ensure that B is willing
to buy, nevertheless, S must cut with a larger probability in these circumstances.
Some of these comparative statics are counter-intuitive, and they may deserve a second
thought. If M increases, for example, a ﬁrst guess may be that S should cut more since
cutting becomes more attractive. In fact, S’s probability of cutting should jump to one, if
initially indiﬀerent. If this happened, however, B would buy with probability one and, as a
best response, S would never cut. Since there is no such equilibrium in pure strategies, this
ﬁrst guess proved wrong. Instead, B is going to buy with a somewhat larger probability,
and S is still willing to randomize. The result is that, perversely, B is more likely to buy
conservation if the value of cutting is large.
Compared to the one-period version of the game, two diﬀerences are striking. First, for
13any exogenous price between the two valuations, the good is conserved with probability
one in the static game, but not in the dynamic version. Second, if S can propose the price,
the equilibrium price can be anything between the valuations in the dynamic game, but
it must equal the upper boundary in the static version.
Puriﬁcation. If the good is divisible, then randomization is not necessary for this
equilibrium. Instead, c can be interpreted as the fraction of the forest that is cut in each
period, as long as it is not sold. More generally, c must be the expected fraction that is
cut in every period. The equilibria described by Proposition 1 survive if the good can be
gradually consumed or cut in this way. Likewise, b can be interpreted as the expected
fraction that is purchased in each period.12
2.3. Payoﬀs and Incentives
From Proposition 1, the equilibrium payoﬀs follow as a corollary:





B’s equilibrium payoﬀ is pinned down by his payoﬀ when purchasing conservation,
while S’s payoﬀ must be such that, when discounted, it is equal to her value of cutting.
Given this, we can easily study the players’ incentives to inﬂuence any of the parameters
in the model, if they could. Although I have not formally modelled any such inﬂuence,
it follows straighforwardly that S has no incentive to increase V or decrease GB, for
example. Any of these changes would raise B’s value of conservation. For a given P, this
would make it more attractive for B to contact S unless, as will happen in equilibrium,
12For these equilibria, we may have other MPEs, as well, if strategies can be conditioned on the fraction
consumed so far. However, using the reasoning from Maskin and Tirole (2001), one may argue that the
fraction cut is not payoﬀ-relevant and that the MPEs should not be conditioned on it.
For b to be interpreted as a fraction, it is necessary that B cannot revise its choice of b after observing
P.
14S cuts slower. S’ payoﬀ is unchanged. Even if P happened to increase following such
an eagerness, S would not beneﬁt since B must be less likely to contact S if P is large
- in order to keep S indiﬀerent. A raise in P is always associated with a corresponding
decrease in b, ensuring that S’ payoﬀ is not altered.
Interestingly, note that @US=@M = 1= > 1. Thus, S’ incentive to raise the market
value, M, is larger than it would have been if conservation had not been an issue (then,
@US=@M = 1). With conservation, B buys with a positive probability, so S has a smaller
chance of being able to enjoy M. This eﬀect ought to reduce S’ incentive to increase M,
particularly when P is given. However, if M increases marginally, B must buy (and pay
P > M) with an even larger probability. This is beneﬁcial for S, and it may strongly
motivate S to raise M, for example by facilitating trade in tropical timber.
The model can easily be reformulated to let also S enjoy some conservation value.
If VS represents the seller’s present discounted value of conservation, she will enjoy this
value unless the good is cut. As long as VS < M + GS, b > 0 and the seller’s equilibrium
payoﬀ is VS + (M + GS − VS)=, which is decreasing in VS! Intuitively, if VS increased,
S would be less willing to cut and, to make her indiﬀerent, B must be less likely to buy.
This decrease in b harms S. Thus, if S could invest in eco-tourism, for example, she would
have no incentive to do this. Similarly, she would have no incentive to reduce her own cost
of protection, since this, as well, would reduce B’s likelihood of paying for conservation.
Corollary 1. The payoﬀs are given by (2.1). Thus, S has no incentive to increase the
values of conservation or reduce the costs of protection, but strong incentives to raise the
consumption value, M.
We can also consider the incentives of the buyer. A boycott, for example, reducing M,
would not necessarily beneﬁt B. In fact, in isolation (for a ﬁxed P), a lower M reduces
the sum of payoﬀs and thus eﬃciency: A small M would make it less tempting to cut
and, thus, B can buy with a smaller probability. It is then less likely that B eventually
15buys before S has already cut. However, since UB is also a function of P, the conclusion
might be diﬀerent if the selected equilibrium price were a function of M.
2.4. Prices and Welfare
Let welfare be an increasing function of both UB and US. Of all equilibria, welfare is
certainly larger in the equilibria characterized by a small price. For the lowest possible
equilibrium price, B buys with probability one. For the highest price in this interval, S
cuts with probability one.
How is the equilibrium P selected? The equilibrium price is the anticipated equilib-
rium, which both S and B may take as given. Anticipating this equilibrium, I have let
S propose a price for the current period once B contacts S. Given the power to set the
price, one may argue that it is reasonable that S picks the equilibrium price, as well. For
example, once B contacts S, S may make the following statement: ”You may think that
the equilibrium price is P, but let me propose that you purchase at price P ′. Since I am
willing to propose P ′ now, it is reasonable that I will propose this P ′ tomorrow, as well,
and thus P ′ is the price I will consider the equilibrium price, from now on.” As long as
P ′ ∈ [M= + GS (1 − )=;V − GB] and S believes B to accept the new equilibrium, this
is self-sustaining and it is thus credible that S will propose P ′ forever: S does not need
to commit when announcing such an equilibrium. Thereafter, B will immediately accept,
since B is indiﬀerent trading at P ′ if this is, indeed, the new equilibrium price. If S has
such power to announce the equilibrium price, once B contacts S, S will certainly ask for
the highest price in the feasible interval. Thus, S suggests P = V −GB and B accepts. Of
course, if S’ power to announce the equilibrium price, once B contacts S, is anticipated,
then b and c are given by Proposition 1 for P = V − GB. To summarize:
16Corollary 2. (i) Total welfare is decreasing in P. (ii) If S announces the equilibrium
P when meeting B, then:
P = V − GB ⇒
b =
M + GS












Endogenizing P in this way, the probability for conservation is simply b, perversely
increasing in the value of cutting and decreasing in the value of conservation. Note that,
as  → 1, b → 0 and the good is consumed always and immediately. In short, the sales
market fails miserably.
3. The Rental Market
3.1. A Model of the Rental Market
The above sales market has several shortcomings: (i) the probability of consumption
may be quite large, (ii) if GB > GS, the equilibrium is always ineﬃcient since the ﬁrst-
best requires no trade and no consumption, (iii) the sales market does not even exist if
GB < V − M, and, ﬁnally (iv) a purchase may require foreign ownership if B and S are
diﬀerent countries. In fact, the threat of nationalization may contribute to a large GB.
For all these reasons, we may be interested in how a rental market performs.
A rental contract means that B pays S to not cut but instead conserve the good for
one period. By assumption, rental contracts last only one period, and future contracts
cannot be negotiated in advance. This assumption is relaxed in the next section, where
the rental contract can be of any length.
Assume that the pay is conditioned on conservation, as is the typical rental contract
for conservation (e.g., the REDD funds). Otherwise, the game is similar to before: In
17every period, B ﬁrst decides whether to contact S. If done, S suggests a rental price, p.
If B accepts, B pays p to S and the good is conserved until the next period. If no rental
contract is signed, S decides whether to consume. Consumption ends the game and gives
the payoﬀ M + GS to S and −V to B, just as before. If S does not consume, the game
continues to the next period. Thus, only consumption ends the game.
If the model had only one period and p were exogenously given, the equilibrium out-
come would be unique and ﬁrst-best for any p ∈ (M − GS;V ). This remains an equilib-
rium if p ∈ [M − GS;V ]. When S sets the price, she suggests p = V and a best response
for B is to contact S and accept this price. But, as before, another best response for B
is to not contact S. Note that the static rental game is identical to the static sales game
when GB = GS = 0.
Just as before, I limit attention to Markov-perfect equilibria that are only conditioned
on whether the good exists. One can easily argue that any other aspect of the history is
not payoﬀ relevant.
3.2. The Equilibrium in the Rental Market
As before, I let b and c represent the probabilities that B contacts S and that S cuts at
her decision node. Thus, B’s strategy is simply (i) his probability of contacting S in any
given period, b ∈ [0;1], and (ii) the threshold, p, for when he would accept the contract.
S’ strategy is to oﬀer exactly the price, p, if B contacts S and, at the cutting stage, S’
strategy speciﬁes her probability of cutting, c ∈ [0;1]. The equilibrium can be summarized
by (b;c;p).
If M +GS > V , no p exists that can make renting mutually beneﬁcial. Furthermore, if
(M + GS)= > V , there exists no mutually beneﬁcial trading price that would discourage
S from cutting, given the chance. From now on, I thus assume (M + GS)= ≤ V:13
13However, if M + GS ∈ (V;V ), then there exists a price p=(1 − ) ∈ (V;V ) which is such that,
although it does not discourage cutting if there is not renting, it makes renting mutually beneﬁcial at the
18Proposition 2. Suppose (M + GS)= < V .
(i) There is only one equilibrium in pure strategies:
b = 0;c = 1;p = (1 − )V:


















S consumes with probability
c =
p(1 − )
V (1 − ) − p
;
B rejects any rental price larger than p, and S proposes exactly this price.
3.3. Analogies
Proposition 2 is clearly analogous to Proposition 1. Its intuition is similar, as well, and
thus skipped. Instead, this subsection discusses some further similarities, while the next
compares the two markets.









Proposition 3. Take an equilibrium P for the sales market and an equilibrium p for the
rental market. The two equilibria are identical in that:
(i) B’s payoﬀ is the same if
p
1 − 
= P + GB:
(ii) For any p and P, S’ payoﬀ is the same in the two markets.
(iii) Thus, S’ incentive to aﬀect M, V , GS, or GB is the same.
(iv) Total welfare decreases in the equilibrium price.
(v) If S announces the equilibrium price, UB = −V and c = 1.
trading stage. Then, if B contacts S, S suggests the price p = (1 − )V and B accepts. Anticipating this,
B is indiﬀerent when considering to contact S, and every b ∈ [0;1] is a best response and an element in
an equilibrium (b;c;p).
19To explain part (i), note that B’s payoﬀ is determined by his payoﬀ when he always
buys/rents. This payoﬀ is obviously a function of the price, and there should be no
surprise that, for some p and P, B’s payoﬀ is identical in the two markets. Part (ii), in
contrast, says that S’ payoﬀ is identical no matter p and P. The reason is that in both
equilibria, when S randomizes, her discounted payoﬀ must equal the value of cutting.
Thus, if the equilibrium p increases, for example, B is less likely to buy, and the two eﬀects
cancel. Given this, Parts (iii)-(v) hold for the same reasons as before. In particular, the
price maximizing welfare is the smallest possible price, p = (1 − )(M + GS)=, since,
then, b = 1. In this equilibrium, the outcome is actually ﬁrst-best. However, if S can
announce the equilibrium p when meeting with B, then p = (1 − )V . Anticipating this,
b = (M + GS)=V < 1 while c = 1, so the good is consumed relatively fast.
3.4. Buy or Rent Conservation?
Despite the similarities just mentioned, the sales market and the rental market are not
equivalent: (i) In the rental market, the game ends only after consumption. Before that
occurs, B randomizes between renting or not in every period, no matter whether he has
rented earlier. (ii) In the rental market, S is protecting the good and not B. (iii) Thus,
if GS < GB, the ﬁrst-best is a possible equilibrium outcome in the rental market, while
this happens almost never in the sales market. Finally, (iv) a sales market only exists if
GB < V − M, while the rental market exists whenever GS < V − M :
To make positive predictions, suppose that, once B has contacted S, S can propose
either a rental price or a sales price. In the sales market, for example, B anticipates
some equilibrium price, P, and S cannot charge a higher price. However, S may want to
propose a rental contract, instead, at some price, p. The question is then whether there
exists some p such that S would beneﬁt from proposing p, rather than P, and B would
accept. In the rental market, similarly, B anticipates some equilibrium p. If B contacts S,
20S cannot charge a higher rental price. However, he may want to, instead, propose a price
P for sale. When can S beneﬁt from this?
Proposition 4. (i) Take an equilibrium in the sales market characterized by P. There
exists a rental market equilibrium that is better for both B and S at the negotiation stage
if:




(ii) Conversely, take an equilibrium in the rental market characterized by p. There exists













Fig. 3: Renting is predicted if GB is large while V − M is small
Interestingly, parts (i) and (ii) say that a sale is more likely if the equilibrium price
(for sales or rentals) is large. If P is large, for example, S can suggest a high p to keep
B indiﬀerent. At a high p, B rents with a small probability and S cuts with a high
probability in every period. The ineﬃciencies are then large and, rather than risking
these randomizations, S and B are better of trading once and for all. Similarly, a sale is
21more attractive if M is small, since B is then unlikely to show up (and rent) again. If GB
is large, however, B ﬁnds it costly to guard the good, and it is better to pay S for this
job.
If S announces the equilibrium price, the condition for sale in part (i) and (ii) are
identical, and rewritten in part (iii). Since the price is then higher if the conservation value
is high, S is better of selling to B rather than continuing the ineﬃcient randomizations.
Thus, if conservation is suﬃciently valuable, conservation is bought rather than rented.
Note that GS does not appear in Proposition 4. Intuitively, one may guess that if GS
is large, then S may prefer to sell, saving the cost of protection. On the other hand, a
higher GS implies that B is more likely to contact S also in the future, and this reduces
the cost of renting. Obviously, the two eﬀects cancel.14
3.5. Multiple Buyers
In reality, there may be multiple potential buyers considering to pay for conservation. To
analyze this, and to motivate the next section, let the game above be unchanged with
one exception: Suppose that, in every period, every i ∈ N = {1;:::;n} decide, at the
same time, whether to contact S. If more than one buyer try to contact S, each of them
is matched with S with an equal probability. The buyers may have diﬀerent valuations,
protection costs, and they may expect to pay diﬀerent equilibrium prices.
Proposition 5. There is no equilibrium where more than one buyer buys or rents with
positive probability: bi · bj = 0 ∀(i;j) ∈ N2, j ̸= i.
The result is disappointing since a larger number of countries makes conservation
more important, from any planner’s point of view. Unfortunately, the only symmetric
(pure or mixed) equilibrium is that no-one ever buys/rents conservation from S, while
14Note that the last condition in Proposition 4 can be rewritten as V > (M + GS)+(GB − GS). The
last term shows that renting is better if GB − GS is positive and large. At the same time, renting is
better if (M + GS) is large, since B is then quite likely to rent also in the future. Parameter GS appears
in both terms - but with opposite signs.
22S cuts immediately and with probability one. The intuition is the following: First, if
a country buys with probability one, no-one else buys. If buyer i randomizes, i must
be indiﬀerent when considering to contact S. In addition, i must be indiﬀerent when S
proposes the equilibrium price to i. This double indiﬀerence requires that i is indiﬀerent
to be matched with S, given that i tries to contact S. This, in turn, requires there is no
chance than any other buyer is matched with S instead.
Proposition 5 shows that the analysis above, assuming exactly one active buyer, is
relevant even if there are third (passive) parties that would also beneﬁt from conservation.
However, the reasoning behind Proposition 5 relies on discrete time (since j does not want
to contact S if also i might at the same exact time). This motivates our next section,
allowing time to be continuous.
4. Continuous Time and Multiple Buyers
This section is gradually extending the model in several ways. First, by letting time be
continuous, I allow the seller to cut and a buyer to contact the seller at any point in time.
The common discount rate is r. Second, I let the rental contract be of any length. If there
is an upper boundary on this length, T, then it is easy to show that this constraint will
always bind in equilibrium. Thus, let T ≤ ∞ be the (maximal and equilibrium) length of
a rental contract. Third, I will allow for any number of potential buyers, and the buyers
can be heterogeneous. Fourth, I will let the good have private as well as public good
aspects, and I will endogenize these beneﬁts.
4.1. A Single Buyer - Revisited
As a start, the above results are restated for the case with continuous time.
23Proposition 6. Suppose time is continuous and a rental contract can be of length T.
(i) In the sales market, the only pure strategy equilibrium is b = 0, c = 1, P = V − GB.
In addition, for every P ∈ [M;V − GB] there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where:
b = r
M + GS




V − P − GB
;
UB = −P − GB;
US = M + GS:
(ii) In the rental market, the only pure strategy equilibrium is b = 0, c = 1, p = rV . In
addition, for every p=
(
1 − e−rT)












1 − e−rT ;
US = M + GS:
(iii) Once B contacts S, anticipating to buy at price P, a rental contract is preferred if:
P ≤ M + (GB − GS)
1 − e−rT
e−rT :
(iv) Once B contacts S, anticipating to rent at price p, a sales contract is preferred if:
p=r − GB ≥ M + (GB − GS)
1 − e−rT
e−rT :
(v) If S can announce the equilibrium price, the good is sold rather than rented if:
V − GB ≥ M + (GB − GS)
1 − e−rT
e−rT . (4.3)
Part (i) is similar to Proposition 1, and in fact identical when the discount rate is
 = e−r∆, ∆ is the length of a period, and one takes the limit as ∆ → 0. Part (ii) is also
identical to Proposition 2 if T = ∆ and ∆ → 0.
Parts (iii)-(v) are also quite similar to the above results, Proposition 4, but the eﬀect
of T is new. Remember that the disadvantage with a rental contract is that the players
continue to randomize as soon as one rental contract has expired. If B and S can commit
24to a longer rental contract, then this disadvantage is somewhat mitigated, and a rental
contract becomes more attractive compared to a sales contract. Thus, if T is suﬃciently
large, (4.3) can never hold unless GS ≥ GB. If T → 0, however, (4.3) is equivalent to
(3.3) when  → 1.
4.2. Multiple Buyers
The continuous time model can easily allow multiple buyers. To simplify, suppose there
are n identical potential buyers (heterogeneity is allowed in the next subsection). Thus,
every i ∈ N = {1;:::;n} receives the payoﬀ −V when S cuts, the payoﬀ −P − GB if i
buys, and zero if j ̸= i buys. In the rental market, the payoﬀs are analogous. As before,
let b represent the rate at which S is contacted by some buyer. Thus, in a symmetric
equilibrium, every i contacts S at the rate bi = 1 − (1 − b)
1=n.
Amazingly, most of the results continue to hold:
Proposition 7. Suppose there are n identical potential buyers. Proposition 6 continues
to hold, with the exception that, in the symmetric equilibrium:
(i) Consumption increases in n in the sales market:
c = r
1 + (1 − 1=n)(M + GS)=(P − M − GS)
V=(P + GB) − 1
:
(ii) Consumption increases in n also in the rental market:
c =




V (1 − e−rT)=p − 1
:
In comparison to Proposition 6, the result is disappointing. If more countries beneﬁt
from conservation, and the planner would be more eager to conserve the good, the outcome
is the reverse. The rate at which some buyer (or a renter) turns up is unchanged if n
grows, but S cuts faster! The intuition is the following. When n is large, every buyer i
beneﬁts since another buyer may contact S and pay for conservation, rather than i. This
reduces i’s willingness to contact S and, to still be willing to randomize, S must cut at a
faster rate.
25The outcome is even worse if the aggregate conservation value is held constant while
n increases (i.e., if the buyers go from acting collectively to acting independently). Then,
Vi = V=n and, for a given P or p, S cuts even faster when n grows, since also Vi decreases
(if the equilibrium price happens to decrease in Vi , however, this eﬀect is somewhat
mitigated). As another prediction, in this situation renting would be more likely as n
grows, since Proposition 6 states that renting is more likely when the buyer’s value is low.
Nevertheless, the similarities to the one-buyer case may be more surprising than the
diﬀerences. First, b is independent of n, given the price. The reason is that S is willing to
randomize only if the rate at which some buyer will drop by, b, multiplied by the price,
makes S indiﬀerent. Furthermore, in equilibrium, every buyer receives the payoﬀ pinned
down by the payoﬀ he would receive if contacting S with probability one. Thus, they do
not, in equilibrium, gain from the presence of other buyers: The beneﬁt that the other
countries may pay for conservation cancels with the cost of the faster cutting rate, for a
given price. For related reasons, the buy-versus-rental decision is also independent of n:
in both markets, the payoﬀs to i ∈ N as well as to S are unaﬀected by n.
4.3. Heterogeneous Buyers
In reality, potential buyers diﬀer widely in their conservation values as well as in their
protection costs. Let Vi be the loss, experienced by i, if S cuts. If buyer i buys, his
protection cost is Gi.
Proposition 8. (i) In the sales market, there are multiple equilibria in mixed strategies.
For every P ∈ (M;mini {Vi − Gi}), S is contacted at rate (4.1), while S cuts at the rate:
c =
r + b−i
Vi=(P + Gi) − 1
∀i | bi > 0.




∈ (M − GS;mini Vi), S is contacted at rate (4.2), while S cuts at the
rate:
c =
r + (b − bi)
(
1 − e−rT)
Vi (1 − e−rT)=p − 1
∀i | bi > 0.
26Corollary 3. (i) In the sales market, buyer i is more likely to buy than buyer j if
Vi=(P + Gi) < Vj=(P + Gj): (ii) In the rental market, i is more likely to rent than j if
Vi < Vj:
Intuitively, if one buyer has a low conservation value or a high protection cost, he is
less willing to contact S unless he expects that the other buyers are unlikely to pay for
conservation. For these reasons, S should expect to be contacted by a buyer that has a
relatively low conservation value and a high cost of protection. Obviously, this is likely
going to lead to the ”wrong” types of buyers in the sales market.15
4.4. Remedies
Privatization. With multiple buyers, conservation becomes a public good. As we al-
ready know, public goods are under-supplied. A remedy may be to raise the private
value when buying (or renting) the good, even if it comes at the cost of the aggregate
conservation value. For example, if the buyer of a tropical forest is allowed to invest in
eco-tourism, he may earn some private revenues, although it may have detrimental im-
pact on the conservation value of other countries. Increasing the private value can increase
the probability of purchasing in the ﬁrst place. To evaluate when such ”privatization”
is socially optimal, suppose privatization increases the buyer’s conservation value by W
units and the world’s conservation value by −Z < 0. Ex post (after sale), it is obviously
beneﬁcial with privatization if only if W > Z:
Proposition 9. Ex ante, privatization is beneﬁcial if W > Z=n. This holds for the sales
market as well as for the rental market.
If W ∈ (Z=n;Z), privatization is suboptimal ex post, but beneﬁcial ex ante. The
reason is, of course, that under privatization each buyer beneﬁts more from a purchase
and less from another country’s purchase. They are thus more tempted to buy, and the
15Proposition 8 presumes that all buyers face the same price. If the prices diﬀer, subscript i should be
added to the prices, as the Appendix shows.
27equilibrium cutting rate declines. Note that the condition W > Z=n is identical to the
condition under which privatization is individually optimal to buyer i after i has purchased
the good. Consequently, the privatization decision can be left to the new buyer in the
above model, even though privatization generates negative externalities on the rest of
the world. In equilibrium, every other country’s ex ante payoﬀ is pinned down by the
fact that it, too, could be the actual buyer in the game, enjoying the same privatization
value. Obviously, privatization is not an ideal remedy and it may not always be feasible
for realistic applications.
Collective action. The free-rider problem among potential buyers can be solved in
two alternative ways. The simplest way is to revert to an asymmetric equilibrium where
only one country is a potential buyer. Both this buyer and the seller are indiﬀerent to
this change of equilibrium, for a given equilibrium price, but every other buyer is strictly
beneﬁtting. Thus, the sum of the buyers’ payoﬀs in this case, referred to as UA, is larger
than the sum of payoﬀs in the previous section. If there is more than one conservation
good, or it is divisible, then every country would strictly beneﬁt by clearly deﬁning which
buyer is responsible for buying and conserving which good. The war of attrition between
the competing buyers is then solved, but the equilibrium is still ineﬃcient and as described
by Proposition 1.
A potentially better solution is for the multiple buyers to solve their collective action
problem by acting as one player. Then, the outcome is as described by Proposition 1,
where the buyer’s valuation is now the sum of the individual valuations. The sum of
the payoﬀs in this case, referred to as UC, is also larger than the sum of the payoﬀs in
the previous section. The larger valuation decreases the cutting rate, beneﬁtting all the
players if the equilibrium price stays unchanged. If the seller can announce the equilibrium
price, however, she will raise the price accordingly and in line with Corollary 2. It is then
easy to show that the buyers would prefer the asymmetric equilibria, rather than acting
28as one.
Proposition 10. For a given price, acting as one is better than the asymmetric equilib-
rium: UC > UA. If S can announce the equilibrium price, however, the reverse is true:
UC < UA. Both statements hold for the sales market as well as for the rental market.
5. Robustness
The model above is simple and can be used as a workhorse for several extensions. Such
extensions may help us to understand the robustness of the results above, and they may
generate new results that are of interest. A large number of extensions is analyzed below:
I there derive nonrandom equilibrium strategies (using puriﬁcation arguments) and allow
for continuous decision-variables (such as the extent to which the forest can be protected)
to show that the main results of this paper hinge neither on the mixed-strategy equi-
libria nor on the binary action variables. I also allow for communication costs, buyers
with bargaining power, and non-Markovian strategies (in particular, the possibility that
bargaining-failure leads to faster cutting).
5.1. Puriﬁcation of Strategies
As is well-known, mixed strategies can be ”puriﬁed” by introducing some noise regarding
future variables. Thus, it is not necessary for the results that the agents are using mixed
strategies in equilibrium, as long as the opponent is uncertain regarding the action taken.
To illustrate this in a simple manner, suppose that the market value of timber, M, is




. Furthermore, suppose that the realization
of M is iid across periods and the realization of the future M is not known to S when S
considers to cut in a given period. With these assumptions, it does not matter whether
the realization is known also to B, as long as B is unaware of its realization when taking
29its own action. In any case, S is going to cut at its decision node if and only if:
M ≥ US ⇒




The seller’s payoﬀ is then given by:
US = bP + (1 − b)(cE(M | M ≥ US) + (1 − c)US)
























As before, P cannot be larger than V . Furthermore, P cannot be smaller than M=2,
since the seller would then reject the buyer’s oﬀer. For a larger P, c must increase, to
keep B indiﬀerent. Then, (5.1) implies that US must decrease. This, from (5.2), requires
a smaller b. For a given P, if M increases, S becomes more tempted to cut, and is willing
to wait only if b increases. The comparative static is thus similar to the one before.
For any given anticipated P, B is indiﬀerent whether to buy and S can therefore charge
exactly this P. Again, there is a range of mixed equilibria characterized by diﬀerent prices,
and for a large price, c must increase but b must decrease.




. There is a continuum of MPEs, each charac-




. S’ decision whether to cut is deterministic
and depending on the realization of M, but the comparative static is similar to before: As
P increases, b decreases and c increases. For a given P, b increases in M and c decreases
in V .
Thus, the main results emphasized above continues to hold. However, if V increases
and c declines, b must increase. Therefore, in this variant of the model, a valuable
conservation good is less likely to be consumed, in contrast to the setting where S can
announce the equilibrium price.
305.2. Puriﬁcation and Interior Solutions
As already mentioned, c could be interpreted as the fraction S is cutting in each period.
Furthermore, rather than having a linear utility in c, making S willing to mix, S could have
concave preferences, pinning down a unique best response for the seller. Similarly, if one
interprets the value of cutting as S’ saved protection costs, one could let the probability
that cutting occurs be a random function of the protection cost. The more S spends on
protection, the more likely it is that the forest survives.
To illustrate this in a simple way, suppose that protecting the good with probability
q costs the seller the amount q2k=2, where k is an arbitrary positive constant. The ﬁrst-
order condition for q is:









q = US=k ⇒




US = bP + (1 − b)
(
−(US=k)
2 k=2 + (US=k)US
)








1 − 2(1 − b)2bP=k:
For US to be stable, we require (1 − b)US=k < 1. Note that US=k = 1 − c, so this
is satisﬁed. Note that both c and US have the similar form as in the previous subsection.
As before, P cannot be larger than V . For a reduced P, c declines, to make B
indiﬀerent. Then, (5.3) implies that US increases, which requires a larger b. Once b = 1,
US = P and (5.3) implies that c = 1 − P=k. For this c to be positive, we must have














(k + V )
2 − 42kV :
As before, a range of prices constitute an equilibrium. If P is larger, c must increase,
i.e., q must decrease. This is possible only if b decreases. If V increases, c declines, US
must increase, implying that b must raise. If the protection cost k increases, S would
be less likely to protect, unless US increases, which requires b to increase. Thus, larger
protection cost for S makes B more likely to buy.
Proposition 12. Suppose S can protect the good with probability q at cost q2k=2. For
each P ∈ [P;V ], there is an equilibrium where S’ eﬀort is given by (5.3) and B buys with
probability b ∈ [0;1]. The comparative static is similar to that before.
To this, one could add costly probabilistic protection also if B ends up buying the
good. Perhaps the cost for B would be larger than the cost for S, as argued above.
Furthermore, it would be desirable to have more general cost functions (for protection).
These and other issues must await further research.
5.3. Buyers with Bargaining Power
Above, for any P > M=, the buyer is randomizing and thus indiﬀerent between trading
at P and not trading at all. This indiﬀerence implies that the buyer received literally no
bargaining surplus from its interaction with the seller. The seller, empowered to make a
tioli-oﬀer, captures the entire gains from trade. Thus, if the buyer has some bargaining
power, we cannot have P > M=. It is easy to see that if the buyer’s bargaining power is
represented by  > 0, the unique equilibrium requires P = M= and that the buyer buys
with probability one.
Proposition 13. Suppose the buyer has bargaining power  while the generalized Nash
Bargaining Solution characterizes the outcome for P. If  > 0, the unique equilibrium
requires P = M= and b = 1.
32At ﬁrst, the result is very encouraging: All that is necessary is to give the buyer some
bargaining power, and eﬃciency will result. However, the fact that P → M= when
 > 0 hinges on a number of assumptions. In particular, one needs to assume that it is
only one buyer, there is no cost of contacting the buyer, and there is no penalty following
bargaining-failure. These three assumptions are relaxed in the following three subsections,
where I continue to let  measure a buyer’s bargaining power.
5.4. Costly Negotiations
Suppose that B must pay k ≥ 0 when contacting S. This cost could represent the physical
relocation cost or set-up cost of a meeting with S, or it could represent the political
obstacles necessary to overcome in the domestic arena when initiating such a conservation
policy.
If B is indiﬀerent whether to trade with S at price P, once B has paid the cost k, B’s
surplus of this trade is the cost just paid, k. If S had all the bargaining power, S could
extract this surplus and, anticipating this, B would never have contacted S in the ﬁrst
place. If B has some bargaining power, however, the equilibrium price is determined by
the fact that S’ surplus must equal the total surplus of trade, multiplied by its bargaining
power 1 − :
P − M = (1 − )(P − M + k)




Naturally, the larger is the buyer’s bargaining power, the lower is the price. Just as before,
b and c are given by the equations above. As before, we still have c > 0 and b < 1 as long
as P > M=. This requires:
 <
k
(1= − 1)M + k
(5.4)
Proposition 14. Suppose B must pay k to contact S. If (5.4) holds, b < 1 and c > 0. If
33k increases or  declines, the unique equilibrium P increases and, as a result, b declines
while c increases.
5.5. Bargaining Failure Leads to Cutting
In the above equilibrium, S is indiﬀerent whether to cut and it is assumed that S continues
to randomize, even if an attempt to negotiate with B has just failed. This a bargaining
failure does not occur in equilibrium, however, it may be reasonable to assume that S
is puzzled by this failure, and concludes that bargaining is not likely to succeed in the
future, either. The best response for S would then be to cut immediately.
Given this threat, S can negotiate a higher price. By using the generalized Nash
Bargaining Solution, the price will be given by:
P = PN ≡ M + (1 − )V: (5.5)




Note that this condition holds trivially when periods get short and  → 1.
Proposition 15. Suppose S cuts if negotiations fail. Then, P = PN; given by (5.5),
increases in M and V but decreasing in .
Again, we get the perverse results that as V increases, the probability that B shows
up to conserve the forest declines.
5.6. Multiple Buyers with Bargaining Power
With multiple buyers having a positive probability of buying, it is not possible that b = 1
since that would require bi = 1 for each of them, and one buyer would ﬁnd it optimal to
leave the purchase to the other. Similarly, b = 0 is not possible when  > 0, since that
would require c = 1 and a negotiated price (PN) that would make it strictly better for a
34buyer to contact S. Thus, each buyer must be indiﬀerent whether to buy. To investigate
this setting in a simple way, it is here assumed that all potential buyers are identical.
Given b, this implies that each buys with a probability bi such that:
1 − b = (1 − bi)
n ⇒ bi = 1 − (1 − b)
1=n .
If several buyers decide to buy in a given period, the seller is matched with each of




− (1 − b)(cV −  (1 − c)UB)
= −
bP=n + (1 − b)cV
1 −  (1 − b)(1 − c)
;
since the good is purchased in this period with probability b at price P and, if so, the
probability that i is the buyer is 1=n. Instead of buying with probability bi, another best
response to a buyer is to not buy in this period. This would give the payoﬀ:
UB = −(1 − bi)
n−1 (cV −  (1 − c)UB) (5.6)
= −(1 − b)




1 −  (1 − b)
1−1=n (1 − c)
:
A buyer is willing to randomize only if these payoﬀs are identical. By substituting the




+ (1 − b)
1=n UB ⇒ UB = −
Pb=n
1 − (1 − b)
1=n. (5.7)
If negotiations break down, a buyer’s continuation value is −cV + (1 − c)UB, which,
using (5.6), is equal to (1 − b)
1=n−1 UB. Thus, once a buyer is matched with the seller, his
bargaining surplus is:
−P − (1 − b)
1=n−1 UB =
P (1 − b)
1=n−1 b=n
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So, the equilibrium P increases in M and decreases in . Furthermore:
Lemma 1. For a given b, the equilibrium P increases in n:

























1 − (1 − b)




where the numerator is of the form:
(lnx) − x + 1:
This function reaches its maximum at 1=x = 1, making it zero, and everywhere else it is
negative. Thus, P does indeed increase in n. QED
For a given P, abstention is better if
(1 − b)
1−1=n cV
1 −  (1 − b)
1−1=n (1 − c)
≤
bP=n + (1 − b)cV








1 −  (1 − b)
1−1=n (1 − c)
]
bP=n; (5.9)
which is less likely to hold if c; V=P, and  are large. If n increases, a suﬃcient condition





36The derivative is negative if:
(1 − b)















b > 1 − 1=e
n,
i.e., if n is suﬃciently large, for a given b. Then, at least, an even larger n is making it
more tempting to cheat, and cutting must increase! For smaller n, a more complicated
derivation would be necessary.
Thus, c must be such that (5.9) holds. If V=P is small,  is large, and n is large and
growing, then c must increase. At c = 1, (5.9) becomes
[
(1 − b)
1−1=n − (1 − b)
]
=b ≤ P=V n: (5.10)
Then, b must be such that this holds to make a buyer indiﬀerent. For this case, P = PN.
Thus, the inequality is more likely to hold if  is small, M is large, V is small, and n is
large, and, in these circumstances, b must decline due the following lemma.
Lemma 2. (5.10) is more likely to hold if b is large.
Proof: Consider the term
[
(1 − b)
1−1=n − (1 − b)
]
. Its derivative w.r.t. b is:
−(1 − 1=n)(1 − b)






37Thus, the derivative of b=
[
(1 − b)
1−1=n − (1 − b)
]
w.r.t. b is positive if:
(1 − b)





































1=n > 0 ⇔
1 − (1 − b)
1=n − b=n > 0 ⇔
n − n(1 − b)
1=n − b > 0:
Now, note that the l.h.s. is zero for b = 0. Next, note that the inequality is more likely
to hold for b large, since its derivative w.r.t. b is strictly positive:
(1 − b)
1=n−1 − 1 > 0:
QED
The ﬁnal proposition summarizes the key ﬁndings above.
Proposition 16. Suppose there are multiple active and identical buyers and  > 0.
(i) In equilibrium, b ∈ (0;1) and c > 0.
(ii) There is a unique equilibrium price, P, which decreases in  but increases in M.
(iii) The sales probability b increases in  but decreases in n.
(iv) The cutting probability c decreases in  but grows when n becomes large, until it hits
the upper boundary c = 1.
(v) If M increases or V decreases, then b is unchanged but c increases until c=1; and, as
M continues to grow or V continues to decline, c stays equal to 1 and b decreases.
386. Conclusions
Conservation goods are special. The buyer does not want to pay the seller unless he
thinks she will consume the good. The seller does not want to consume if she thinks
the buyer is going to buy. In a dynamic model, the equilibrium is in mixed strategy
and the outcome is ineﬃcient. The rental market may not perform better than the sales
market but, by comparison, the results predict that domestic conservation will be bought,
while conservation in other countries will be rented. This seems consistent with anecdotal
evidence: REDD contracts are rental arrangements; national parks are not.
While the outcome is bad with one buyer, it is worse with multiple potential buyers.
If the buyers are heterogeneous, the results predict that, perversely, the most likely renter
(or buyer) is going to have a relatively low value of conservation (and a high cost of
enforcing protection). The emergence of Norway’s REDD funds is consistent with this
prediction: Norway has already initiated results-based payments through partnerships
with Brazil, Guyana, and Indonesia.
In order to isolate the key feature of conservation goods, I have abstracted from uncer-
tainty, private information, reputation-building, learning, moral hazard, and more compli-
cated utility functions, bargaining procedures, or equilibrium reﬁnements. These aspects
should be included in future research to teach us more about the puzzling nature of
conservation markets.
397. Appendix: Proofs
In the proofs below, I have allowed for a cost, ki ≥ 0, when buyer i decides to contact
the seller. With only one buyer, this cost is k. For most of the results above, simply set
ki = k = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let P denote the equilibrium price, b the probability that B meets
S, and c the probability that S cuts, given the chance (i.e., at her decision node). Let
Ui (b;c) describe the equilibrium payoﬀ (and thus the continuation value) for i ∈ {B;S}.
We have:
UB (0;c) = −cV +  (1 − c)UB (b;c);
UB (1;c) = −P − k − GB;
US (b;0) = b(P + GS) + (1 − b)US (b;c);
US (b;1) = b(P + GS) + (1 − b)(M + GS):
Since c ∈ [0;1], UB must be between −V and 0. Thus, B never buys if P +GB+k > V .
Hence, for such a large P, S will always cut. Similarly, since b ∈ [0;1], US must be
between M + GS and P + GS. Thus, S always cuts if M + GS >  (P + GS) , implying
P < M= + GS (1= − 1) and, then, B always buys if V > M= + GB + k, since then
V > P +GB+k. If P ∈ [M= + GS (1= − 1);V − GB − k], UB (0;c) = UB (1;c) for some
c ∈ [0;1] and US (b;0) = US (b;1) for some b ∈ [0;1]. It is easy to see that these equalities
are satisﬁed for b and c, as described in Proposition 1, making both players willing to
randomize. For a larger (smaller) c, B always (never) buys and S would strictly prefer
to never (always) cut; a contradiction. For a larger (smaller) b, S would prefer to never
(always) cut and B would therefore strictly prefer to never (always) buy; a contradition.
Therefore, for every P ∈ [M= + GS (1= − 1);V − GB − k), the b and c described by
Proposition 1 is a unique equilibrium. For P = V −GB −k, there is in addition equilibria
where B buys with a smaller probability: Any b ∈ [0;(M + GS)(1 − )= (V − GB − M)]
is then part of an equilibrium.
Regarding the equilibrium price, suppose B and S believes the equlibrium price is
P ∈ [M=;V − GB − k]. If B contacts S, he is indiﬀerent to buy at P, and S cannot
charge a higher P. S thus charges P, conﬁrming that this is indeed an equilibrium. Note
that a low price, P < M= + GS (1= − 1), cannot be an equilibrium since, if it were, S
would cut for sure at her decision node, and under this threat S could demand as much as
V − GB. A high price, P > V − GB, cannot be an equilibrim since then B would reject.
P ∈ (V − GB;V − GB + k] is a possible equilibrium price but B is then never contacting
S. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is analoguous to the proof of Proposition 1. With a
slight abuse of notation, let now b be the probability that B contacts S to rent, while c is
40the probability that S cuts at her decision node. In equilibrium, we must have:
UB (0;c) = −cV +  (1 − c)UB (b;c);
UB (1;c) = −p + UB (b;c);
US (b;0) = bp + (1 − b)US (b;c);
US (b;1) = bp + (1 − b)(M + GS):
Since c ∈ [0;1], UB ∈ [−V;0], and p > V=(1 − ) would be rejected and thus never re-
quested by S. Since S can always cut, US > M+GS and S would always prefer to cut if M+
GS > p=(1 − ), implying that p < (M + GS)(1= − 1) cannot be an equilibrium (since
under that threat, S could charge a higher price. If p ∈ [(M + GS)(1= − 1);V=(1 − )),
then there is an unique equilibrium where b and c must be such as speciﬁed by Propo-
sition 2. If p = V=(1 − ) then, in addition, there exist equilibria where b is smaller
than what is speciﬁed by Proposition 2: any b ∈ [0;(M + GS)=V ] is then part of an
equilibrium. Since the buyer is indiﬀerent whether to buy for every equilibrium in which
p ∈ [(M + GS)(1= − 1);V=(1 − )], S cannot charge a higher price (that would be re-
jected by B) and S asks for exactly p, conﬁrming that every such price is an equilibrium.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows from the text and the earlier propositions.
Proof of Proposition 4. Take a sale P-equilibrium and a rental p-equilibrium. B prefers
buying at P to the rental p-equilibrium (before as well as at the meeting with S) if:
P + GB + k ≤ (p + k)=(1 − ): (7.1)
At their meeting, B prefers selling at P to the p-equilibrium if:
P + GS ≥ p + U
r
S = p + M + GS: (7.2)
(i) Consider an equilibrium P. A p exists violating both (7.1) and (7.2) if (3.1) is violated.
Too see this, select the p, as a function of P, making one player indiﬀerent and check
whether the other condition holds.
(ii) Take p as given. Then, a P exists satisfying (7.1) and (7.2) if (3.2) holds. Too see
this, select the P, as a function of p, making one player indiﬀerent and check whether the
other condition holds.
(iii) When S announces the equilibrium price, P + GB = p=(1 − ) and (7.1) and (7.2)
coincide with (3.3). QED
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is similar to the reasoning in the text and thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proposition follows from Proposition 7 when setting n = 1.
Proofs of Propositions 7 and 8. The proofs allow for heterogeneous values and prices.
41The sales market: The aggregate b and expected P making S willing to randomize follows
from:


































Buyer i is willing to randomize when:




−t(r+b i+c) (cVi + b−iZi)dt =
cVi + b−iZi
c + b−i + r
⇒
c =
(Pi + Gi + ki + Zi − Wi)(b−i + r) − b−iZi
Vi − (Pi + Gi + ki + Zi − Wi)
=
r(Pi + Gi + ki + Zi − Wi) + b−i (Pi + Gi + ki − Wi)
V − (Pi + Gi + ki + Zi − Wi)
:
Setting Wi = Zi = ki = 0, this becomes:
c =
r + b−i
Vi=(Pi + Gi) − 1
=
(r + b)(Pi + Gi) − bi (Pi + Gi)
Vi − (Pi + Gi)
:
Since bi = b −
∑
j̸=i bj and b is given by (7.3), bi decreases by adding another buyer, b−i
increases, and this requires c to increase. Imposing symmetry, bi = b=n.
The rental market: If S is willing to mix, US = M + GS and:

























Ep + (M + GS)e−rT − (M + GS)
= r
M + GS
Ep − (1 − e−rT)(M + GS)
:




























r + b−i + c
⇒
c =
























− (pi + ki)
]
Vi + Wi − Zi − (pi + ki)=(1 − e−rT)
:






Vi=pi − 1=(1 − e−rT)
.
By comparison: Buyer i’s beneﬁt is the same for all p′;T ′ such that Ui is the same:
pi + ki
1 − e−rT = Pi + Gi + ki:
While S prefers sale if and only if:
Pi + GS ≥ pi + e
−rTUS = pi + e
−rT (M + GS):
Ensuring that B is (just) willing to accept, this implies:




(Pi + Gi + ki) − ki + e


















(Gi − GS): (7.4)
Equivalently, S prefers selling to an existing rental equilibrium if it can achieve a high
price when selling:
pi + ki
1 − e−rT − Gi − ki + GS ≥ pi + e










(M + GS) ⇒
pi + ki
1 − e−rT ≥ (Gi − GS)=e
−rT + (M + GS): (7.5)




(Gi − GS) while (7.5)
becomes Vi ≥ (Gi − GS)=e−rT +(M + GS); which are both identical to (4.3) when ki = 0
and buyers are identical. QED
Proof of Proposition 9. The proposition follows directly from the equilibrium payoﬀs,
since each buyer is willing to randomize and get the payoﬀ −Pi +Wi −Zi−Gi, if buying,
and pi=(1 − ) + Wi − Zi, if renting. QED
Proof of Proposition 10. Set Wi = Zi = 0: Consider the sales market and suppose, ﬁrst,
that P is given. In the decentralized equilibrium, where each buyer buys with some
probability, every i’s payoﬀ is −P −GB: If, instead, it is well deﬁned that only one player
purchases, then, following Proposition 7, b remains constant while c declines. This is
clearly increasing the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ. Furthermore, if the buyers act as one,
then there is still only a single buyer, but this buyer’s valuation increases. Following
Proposition 1, c declines, which clearly is further increasing total welfare (since b stays
the same).
If S can announce the equilibrium price, however, a single buyer (e.g., consisting of
all the countries) receives the same payoﬀ as if the good is cut with probability one. In
43the asymmetric equilibrium, the buyers that have committed not to buy receives a higher
payoﬀ that −Vi since, with a positive probability, the single remaining buyer purchases
and conserves the good. Thus, when S sets the price, the asymmetric equilibrium leads
to a larger aggregate payoﬀ for the buyers than does the asymmetric equilibrium.
The reasoning for the rental market is analoguous and thus omitted. QED
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